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uous) utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives, a
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ing rules it is shown that this condition is not only implied by but in
fact equivalent to the influence of any single agent reducing to zero as
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1 Introduction
A voting mechanism for public goods is strategy-proof if no voter can gain
by not voting according to his true preference. There are good reasons to use
strategy-proof voting mechanisms, the main one being that the final decision
will be based on the right information. Unfortunately, in general a high price
has to be paid in order to attain strategy-proofness. In the classical model of
social choice studied by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) this price
is dictatoriality of the mechanism, and in the classical literature on demand
revealing public good provision (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) the price is
budget imbalance. Better results are obtained if the domains of preferences
as well as alternatives are restricted. Moulin (1980) considers single-peaked
preferences on the real line and characterizes a class of generalized median
mechanisms. However, in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space with single-
peaked preferences, a mechanism is dictatorial if it is strategy-proof and
the range of the mechanism is at least two-dimensional (Zhou, 1991). Even
in these cases, rather natural mechanisms like taking the average vote, are
excluded by strategy-proofness.
In the present paper we question the compellingness of the strategy-
proofness condition based on the following considerations. First of all, if
a mechanism is not strategy-proof, it may yet be difficult and risky for any
single agent to try to manipulate the final outcome by insincere voting if he
does not exactly know the preferences of the other agents. Moreover, even if
he does know these preferences he would have to take into account potential
manipulation by the other agents. Second and additional, even if some gain
is to be reached by manipulation, this will generally be rather small if there
are many agents, and it will not outweigh the cost of finding out the best
way to manipulate. For these reasons it seems safe to assume that especially
in larger voting problems agents will not be interested in manipulation, even
if there is a theoretical potential for gain. Indeed, political scientists do not
tend to be particularly interested in strategic aspects of voting systems.
The present paper is an attempt to formalize these considerations. A
global summary of our main findings is as follows. In our framework, voting
mechanisms that are ‘competitive’ in the sense that any single voter has
negligible influence, are shown to be hardly manipulable. This is obvious and
intuitive. More interestingly, for anonymous mechanisms (which is the usual
case) also the converse holds: Limited strategic manipulability must imply
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competitiveness of the voting mechanism. Taking the average vote turns out
to be the unique anonymous and unanimous mechanism that satisfies limited
strategic manipulability in a sharp sense, i.e., for the minimum number of
agents.
In somewhat more detail, we will assume a framework where agents have
continuous preferences on some Euclidean space, which may represent dif-
ferent aspects of the political spectrum. Limited strategic manipulability is
modeled by the condition of threshold strategy-proofness on a voting mech-
anism or rule. This condition means that, given that there are sufficiently
many agents, no agent can gain more than a small amount in utility by not
reporting a best point. This unavoidably raises the question how to measure
utility gains. This is not possible in a purely ordinal framework, and in fact
we will impose a condition of Lipschitz continuity on the utility functions
representing the preferences. It should be noted that no single-peakedness
condition will be imposed, which makes our model also in this respect differ-
ent from Moulin (1980) and Zhou (1991).
As announced above, the first main result of the paper is that for anony-
mous voting rules threshold strategy-proofness is equivalent to a condition
saying that, as the number of agents becomes large, the influence of any sin-
gle agent on the outcome of the voting rule reduces to zero. Next, for a large
class of voting rules a sharp lower bound on the number of agents will be de-
rived in order that the maximal utility gain by manipulation is limited. The
second main result is that, if there are at least five agents, then anonymity,
unanimity, and this sharp lower bound characterize the mean rule (taking
the average of the votes). In other words, the number of agents needed to
make a voting rule ‘almost’ (threshold) strategy-proof is minimal in case of
the mean rule.
Both results confirm plausible intuitions. The first result not only es-
tablishes that strategic manipulation issues vanish if each single voter has
a negligible influence, as is the case in large voting problems. More impor-
tantly, it says that this negligible influence is a necessary condition in order
to avoid strategic manipulation. Note that this result is not obvious: for in-
stance, generalized medians in the one-dimensional case with single-peaked
preferences are strategy-proof but do not entail negligable influence of indi-
viduals. The second result says that a natural rule like the mean rule seems
the best one to use if manipulation biases should only be small.
As far as we are aware the literature on this particular theme is rather
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limited. Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000) show that in a growing consumer
population it is possible to have a revelation mechanism for the production
of public goods that is strategy-proof, budget balanced, and approximately
efficient. The following references concern private goods. Roberts and Postle-
waite (1976) show that in an exchange economy the gain from not announcing
one’s competitive demand goes to zero as the number of consumers increases
through replication. Gul and Postlewaite (1992) derive that in an exchange
economy with asymmetric information the tension between incentive com-
patibility and efficiency disappears as the agents are sufficiently replicated.
Co´rdoba and Hammond (1998) show that in a class of smooth random ex-
change economies there are mechanisms that are nonmanipulable in the limit
with probability one. Though in a different (private goods) context, these
results are similar in spirit to ours. Schummer (1999) considers a condition
of ²-dominance of truth-telling in a two-person exchange economy without,
however, increasing the number of agents.
Section 2 gives the formal model and a preliminary result. Section 3 char-
acterizes anonymous and threshold strategy-proof voting rules, and Section
4 characterizes the mean rule in terms of sharp threshold strategy-proofness.
The more technical proofs are collected in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
The set of alternatives is the m-dimensional Euclidean space IRm. A point of
IRm can be interpreted as the location of a public decision, or of a political
party, in an election with respect to m attributes, or political viewpoints.
Preferences are represented by utility functions u : IRm → IR that are
Lipschitz continuous, that is, there is an L > 0 such that |u(a) − u(b)| ≤
L‖a− b‖ for all a, b ∈ IRm. Here, without loss of generality we take ‖ ·‖ to be
the Euclidean norm. The number L is called a Lipschitz constant and UL is
the set of all utility functions with Lipschitz constant L. Lipschitz continuity
in this context can be interpreted, roughly, as the requirement that utility
functions do not exhibit fast changes.
For a compact set C ⊆ IRm, an alternative x ∈ C is a best alternative of
a utility function u in C if u(x) ≥ u(y) for all y ∈ C. Since u is Lipschitz
continuous and C compact, a best alternative always exists.
The set of (potential) agents is identified with the set of natural numbers
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IN . Let P denote the set of all non-empty and finite subsets of IN . For
N ∈ P , |N | denotes the cardinality of the set N . A voting problem is
a pair (N, p), where N ∈ P and p ∈ (IRm)N is a profile of votes. This
implies that each agent i ∈ N is allowed to report (vote for) one alternative
p(i) ∈ IRm. A voting rule F assigns to each voting problem (N, p) one
alternative F (N, p) ∈ IRm. Instead of F (N, p) we will often just write F (p),
in particular if it is obvious what the set of agents N is.
For a set of agents N ∈ P and an agent i ∈ N , the profiles p, q are called
i-deviations if p(j) = q(j) for all j ∈ N\{i}. The central property under
investigation in this paper is the following.
Definition 1 A voting rule F is threshold strategy-proof if for every compact
set C ⊆ IRm, every L > 0, and every ² > 0, there is a real number k > 0 such
that for every N ∈ P with |N | ≥ k, every i ∈ N , all i-deviations p, q ∈ CN ,
and every utility function u ∈ UL for which p(i) is a best alternative in C,
we have:
u(F (q))− u(F (p)) ≤ ². ¢
Threshold strategy-proofness says the following. Suppose that votes are re-
stricted to a compact subset and utility functions are Lipschitz continuous.
Then, given that there are sufficiently many agents, an agent cannot gain
more than a small amount ² by voting for a possibly suboptimal alternative.
In other words, under these conditions it is hardly worthwhile to try manip-
ulation by strategic voting. The usual strategy-proofness condition would
require the inequality in the definition to hold for ² = 0. Hence, threshold
strategy-proofness is a relaxation of strategy-proofness.
The following lemma shows an important consequence of threshold strat-
egy-proofness: by manipulation, either the resulting alternative remains ap-
proximately the same, or the manipulating agent is almost a dictator with
respect to the votes under comparison. This result will be used frequently in
the sequel.
Lemma 1 Let F be a threshold strategy-proof voting rule and let C, L, ²,
and k be as in Definition 1. Let N ∈ P be a set of agents with |N | ≥ k,
let i ∈ N , and let p, q ∈ CN be i-deviations. Then ‖F (p) − F (q)‖ ≤ ²/L or
[‖p(i)− F (p)‖ ≤ ²/L and ‖q(i)− F (q)‖ ≤ ²/L].
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Proof. Define u′ ∈ UL by u′(x) = L‖F (p) − x‖ for all x ∈ IRm. Define
u ∈ UL by u(x) = min{u′(x), u′(p(i))} for all x ∈ IRm. By threshold strategy-
proofness and the definition of u,
² ≥ u(F (q))− u(F (p)) = Lmin{‖p(i)− F (p)‖, ‖F (p)− F (q)‖}.
This implies ‖F (p) − F (q)‖ ≤ ²/L or ‖p(i) − F (p)‖ ≤ ²/L. The remaining
statement in the lemma follows by symmetry. 2
3 Anonymity and threshold strategy-proof-
ness
In this section we characterize all anonymous and threshold strategy-proof
voting rules. Let ◦ denote composition of maps.
Definition 2 A voting rule F is anonymous if for all sets of agentsN,M ∈ P
with |N | = |M |, all bijections σ : M → N , and all profiles p ∈ (IRm)N , we
have:
F (N, p) = F (M, p ◦ σ). ¢
In other words, a voting rule is anonymous if the identities of the agents do
not matter.
Definition 3 A voting rule F is insensitive at large populations if for every
² > 0 and every compact set C ⊆ IRm there is a real number k such that for
every N ∈ P with |N | ≥ k, every i ∈ N , and all i-deviations p, q ∈ CN we
have:
‖F (p)− F (q)‖ ≤ ². ¢
Thus, if a voting rule is insensitive at large populations, the influence of a
single agent becomes small as the number of agents becomes large. Since
by Lipschitz continuity small changes in the alternatives can lead to only
small changes in utility, the condition implies threshold strategy-proofness.
Formally:
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Proposition 1 Let F be a voting rule that is insensitive at large populations.
Then F is threshold strategy-proof.
Proof. Let C be a compact subset of IRm and let ² > 0. Let L > 0 and
choose k ∈ IR such that for every N ∈ P with |N | ≥ k, every i ∈ N and
all i-deviations p, q ∈ CN , we have ‖F (p)− F (q)‖ ≤ ²/L. Consequently, for
such profiles and for u ∈ UL, it follows that
u(F (p))− u(F (q)) ≤ L‖F (p)− F (q)‖ ≤ ².
Hence, F is threshold strategy-proof. 2
The converse of Proposition 1 does not hold. For instance, a dictatorial rule,
assigning to any profile of votes the same agent’s reported point, is threshold
strategy-proof but not insensitive at large populations. Under anonymity,
however, the two conditions are equivalent.
Theorem 1 An anonymous voting rule is threshold strategy-proof if and only
if it is insensitive at large populations.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 5. The if-part (in fact, Proposition
1) states the intuitive and obvious fact that, if the influence of a single agent
vanishes as the population of voters becomes large, then so does his potential
for strategic manipulation. The only-if part is more interesting and more
difficult to prove: if the voting rule is anonymous and the possibility for
strategic manipulation vanishes as the population grows, then any single
agent’s influence must vanish at all. Observe that median rules (Moulin,
1980) are anonymous but not insensitive at large populations: for those
rules there always exist situations where a single agent’s vote may have a
tremendous influence on the public outcome. Consequently, these rules also
violate threshold strategy-proofness (that is, outside of the single-peaked
domain).
4 Sharp bounds and the mean rule
In this section we first derive a lower bound for the number of agents in order
that for a given voting rule each agent can gain at most ² by manipulation. In
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other words, we establish a lower bound for the number k as in the definition
of threshold strategy-proofness. This will be done for voting rules that are
anonymous and translation invariant.
Definition 4 A voting rule F is translation invariant if for every set of
agents N ∈ P , every c ∈ IRm, and every profile p ∈ (IRm)N , we have:
F (N, p+ (c, . . . , c)) = F (N, p) + c. ¢
Translation invariance makes the voting rule independent of the choice of
the zero. It is satisfied by all voting rules of interest. The next lemma
provides the announced lower bound. For a compact set C in IRm we define
diam(C) := max{‖a− b‖ : a, b ∈ C}.
Lemma 2 Let F be an anonymous, translation invariant and threshold strat-
egy-proof voting rule. Let C ⊆ IRm be convex and compact. Let ² > 0, L > 0,
and k ≥ 3 be as in Definition 1. Then k ≥ L diam(C)/².
A proof of this lemma is given in Section 5.
The remainder of the section is devoted to the study of voting rules that meet
the lower bound derived in Lemma 2. This will result in a characterization
of the mean rule. First, we formalize this condition.
Definition 5 A voting rule F is sharp threshold strategy-proof if for ev-
ery compact subset C ⊆ IRm, every L > 0, every ² > 0, every N ∈ P
with |N | ≥ L diam(C)/², all i-deviations p, q ∈ CN , and all utility functions
u ∈ UL for which p(i) is a best alternative on C, we have:
u(F (q))− u(F (p)) ≤ ². ¢
An example of a sharp threshold strategy-proof voting rule is the mean rule
Fmean, defined by Fmean(p) =
∑
i∈N p(i)/|N | for every N ∈ P and every profile
p ∈ (IRm)N . Sharp threshold strategy-proofness follows from the fact that
for p, q as in Definition 5,
u(Fmean(q))− u(Fmean(p)) ≤ L‖Fmean(p)− Fmean(q)‖
= L‖p(i)− q(i)‖/|N |
≤ L diam(C)/|N |
≤ ².
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It turns out that, basically, the mean rule is the unique sharp threshold
strategy-proof voting rule of interest. The following theorem makes this
statement precise. A voting rule F is unanimous if F (a, . . . , a) = a for every
a ∈ IRm.
Theorem 2 Let F be a unanimous, anonymous and sharp threshold strategy-
proof voting rule. Then F is equal to the mean rule for all profiles with at
least five agents.
A proof of this theorem can be found in Section 5.
Theorem 2 does not hold for less than four agents. Letm = 1 and let F be
the mean rule in case the number of agents is four or more. For three agents,
let F assign to every profile p the point 2
3
min{p(i) : i ∈ N} + 1
3
max{p(i) :
i ∈ N}; and for two agents let F assign the lower one of the reported votes.
Altogether, this defines a voting rule satisfying the properties in Theorem 2.
It is an open problem whether the rule can also be different for the border
line case of four agents. An answer to this problem, however, is of limited
interest since we are concerned with large voting problems.
The following examples establish the logical independence of the proper-
ties in Theorem 2. In these examples, m = 1.
Example 1 For all N ∈ P and p ∈ IRN , let
F˜ (p) := median(min{p(i) : i ∈ N}, 0,max{p(i) : i ∈ N}).
This rule is unanimous and anonymous, but not threshold strategy-proof.¢
Example 2 For all N ∈ P and p ∈ IRN , let F 0(p) := 0. This rule is
anonymous and sharp threshold strategy-proof, but not unanimous. ¢
Example 3 For all N ∈ P and p ∈ IRN , let F ′(p) := p(minN). This rule is
unanimous and sharp threshold strategy-proof, but not anonymous. ¢
5 Proofs
We start with a technical, auxiliary lemma. For a ∈ IRm and ² > 0 denote
by B(a, ²) := {x ∈ IRm : ‖a − x‖ ≤ ²} the ball with centre a and radius ².
For a set C ⊆ IRm, conv(C) denotes the convex hull of C, i.e., the smallest
convex set containing C.
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Lemma 3 Let a, b, c ∈ IRm such that c = 1
2
(a + b). Let λ > 0 such that
‖a − b‖ ≥ 5λ. Let C1 = conv({a} ∪ B(c, 1
2
λ)), C2 = conv({b} ∪ B(c, 1
2
λ)),
and C = conv(C1 ∪ C2) (= C1 ∪ C2).
Let F be a voting rule and let N ∈ P and assume that for all i ∈ N and
all i-deviations p, q ∈ CN
‖F (p)− F (q)‖ ≤ λ or [‖F (p)− p(i)‖ ≤ λ and ‖F (q)− q(i)‖ ≤ λ] (1)
with all inequalities strict whenever p, q ∈ (C1)N or p, q ∈ (C2)N .
Let r ∈ B(c, 1
2
λ)N and j ∈ N , and for x ∈ IRm denote by rx the j-
deviation of r defined by r(j) = x. Assume that ‖F (ra) − a‖ ≤ λ and
‖F (rb)− b‖ ≤ λ.
Then F is not anonymous.
Proof. Without loss of generality let N = {1, . . . , n} and j = n.
For t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and x ∈ IRm let wt,x be the profile defined for all
i ∈ N by
wt,x(i) =
{
rx if i > t
c if i ≤ t.
For t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} we now prove that
‖F (wt,a)− a‖ ≤ λ and ‖F (wt,b)− b‖ ≤ λ. (2)
Case t = 0. Since w0,a = ra and w0,b = b this is the assumption made in the
statement of the lemma.
Case t = 1. Since w1,a, w0,a are 1-deviations, (1) implies
‖F (w1,a)− F (w0,a)‖ < λ or ‖F (w0,a)− ra(1)‖, ‖F (w1,a)− c‖ < λ. (3)
Since by case t = 0 we have ‖F (w0,a)−a‖ ≤ λ and, further, ra(1) ∈ B(c, 1
2
λ)
and ‖a− c‖ ≥ 5
2
λ, we have ‖F (w0,a)− ra(1)‖ ≥ λ. So (3) implies ‖F (w1,a)−
F (w0,a)‖ < λ. Since ‖F (w0,a)− a‖ ≤ λ, it follows that ‖F (w1,a)− a‖ < 2λ.
Similarly, ‖F (w1,b − b‖ < 2λ.
Since w1,a, w1,b are n-deviations in CN , (1) implies
‖F (w1,a)− F (w1,b)‖ ≤ λ or ‖F (w1,a)− a‖, ‖F (w1,b)− b‖ ≤ λ. (4)
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As ‖F (w1,a − a‖ < 2λ, ‖F (w1,b − b‖ < 2λ, and ‖a − b‖ ≥ 5λ, the first
inequality in (4) does not hold. Hence (4) implies ‖F (w1,a) − a‖ ≤ λ and
‖F (w1,b)− b‖ ≤ λ. This concludes case t = 1.
Cases t = 2, . . . , n − 1 are analogous to case t = 1. Hence, we have proved
(2).
For x, y ∈ C consider the profile vx,y ∈ CN defined for all i ∈ N by
vx,y(i) =

x if i = 1
c if 1 < i < n
y if i = n.
Since vb,a and wn−1,a are 1-deviations in CN we have by (1) that ‖F (vb,a)−
F (wn−1,a)‖ ≤ λ or [‖F (vb,a) − b‖ ≤ λ and ‖F (wn−1,a) − c‖ ≤ λ]. Now
the latter cannot be the case since ‖a − c‖ ≥ 5
2
λ and, by (2) for t = n −
1, ‖f(wn−1,a) − a‖ ≤ λ. Hence the former must be the case, ‖F (vb,a) −
F (wn−1,a)‖ ≤ λ, and together with ‖f(wn−1,a)−a‖ ≤ λ this implies ‖F (vb,a)−
a‖ ≤ 2λ.
Similarly one proves ‖F (va,b) − b‖ ≤ 2λ. Since ‖a − b‖ ≥ 5λ, it follows
that F (va,b) 6= F (vb,a). So F is not anonymous. 2
Proof of Theorem 1. In view of Proposition 1 it is sufficient to prove the
only-if part. Suppose that F is threshold strategy-proof but not insensitive
at large populations. Then it is sufficient to prove that F is not anonymous.
Since F is not insensitive at large populations there is a δ > 0 and a
compact subset C ′ of IRm such that for every k′ > 0 there is a set of agents
N ′ with |N ′| ≥ k′ and a j ∈ N ′ and j-deviations v, w ∈ (C ′)N ′ with
‖F (v)− F (w)‖ ≥ δ. (5)
Take c ∈ C ′, a, b ∈ IRm, and λ > 0 such that c = 1
2
(a+ b), C ′ ⊆ B(c, 1
2
λ),
and ‖a− b‖ ≥ 5λ. Let C,C1, C2 as in Lemma 3.
Take 0 < ² < min{λ, 1
2
δ}. By Lemma 1 there is a k > 0 such that for all
N ∈ P with |N | ≥ k, all i ∈ N and all i-deviations p, q ∈ CN we have:
‖F (p)− p(i)‖, ‖F (q)− q(i)‖ ≤ ² < λ or ‖F (p)− F (q)‖ ≤ ² < λ. (6)
Take k′ (as in the second paragraph of the proof) equal to k, and let N ′, j,
v, and w as in the second paragraph. Note that (1) in Lemma 3 is satisfied.
So by this lemma, letting v play the role of r, it is sufficient to prove that
‖F (va)− a‖ ≤ λ and ‖F (vb)− b‖ ≤ λ,
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where, analogously to rx in Lemma 3, vx is the j-deviation of v with v(j) = x.
By (6) we have:
‖F (va)− F (v)‖ ≤ ² or ‖F (va)− a‖ ≤ ²
and
‖F (wa)− F (w)‖ ≤ ² or ‖F (wa)− a‖ ≤ ².
Suppose that ‖F (va)− a‖ > λ. Then ‖F (va)− a‖ > ² and since va = wa, we
have both ‖F (va)− F (v)‖ ≤ ² and ‖F (wa)− F (w)‖ = ‖F (va)− F (w)‖ ≤ ².
This implies ‖F (v) − F (w)‖ ≤ 2² < δ, in contradiction with (5). Thus, we
must have ‖F (va) − a‖ ≤ λ. Similarly, one proves ‖F (vb) − b‖ ≤ λ. This
completes the proof of the theorem. 2
We proceed with the proof of Lemma 2. For a compact set C ⊆ (IRm)N ,
points a and b in C are called diametrical if diam(C) = ‖a− b‖.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let a and b be diametrical points in C. Without
loss of generality suppose k ∈ IN . Let N = {1, 2, . . . , k} and let the profiles
p, q ∈ CN be defined by
p(i) = a+ (i− 1)(b− a)/k and q(i) = a+ i(b− a)/k for every i ∈ N.
Since C is convex, for all i ∈ N , p(i), q(i) ∈ C. By translation invariance,
F (q) = F (p) + (b − a)/k. Since k ≥ 3, we have ‖F (p) − a‖ ≥ ‖b − a‖/k or
‖F (q) − b‖ ≥ ‖b − a‖/k. Without loss of generality assume ‖F (p) − a‖ ≥
‖b − a‖/k. Let u′ ∈ UL be defined by u′(x) = L‖F (p) − x‖ for all x ∈ IRm,
and u by u(x) = min{u′(x), u′(a)}. (This construction is similar as in the
proof of Lemma 1.) Note that, by anonymity, p and q can be regarded as
1-deviations. We have
² ≥ u(F (q))− u(F (p))
= u(F (p) + (b− a)/k)
= min{L‖b− a‖/k, L‖F (p)− a‖}
= L‖b− a‖/k,
where the inequality follows from threshold strategy-proofness, the first equal-
ity from F (p) = F (q) + (b − a)/k and u(F (p)) = 0, and the third equality
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Figure 1: Proof of Lemma 4
from ‖F (p) − a‖ ≥ ‖b − a‖/k. Hence, k ≥ L‖b − a‖/², which was to be
proved. 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 4 Let F be an anonymous and sharp threshold strategy-proof voting
rule. Let N ∈ P with n = |N | ≥ 5. Let C be a compact and convex subset
of IRm with diametrical points a and b. Let j ∈ N and let p, q ∈ CN be j-
deviations such that p(j) = a and q(j) = b. Then ‖F (p)−F (q)‖ ≤ ‖b−a‖/n.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that
‖F (p)− F (q)‖ > ‖b− a‖/n. (7)
Take L > 0 and ² = L‖a − b‖/n. Let c = 1
2
(a + b) and for x ∈ IRm let
px be the j-deviation of p defined by px(j) = x. For x, y ∈ IRm such that
a ∈ conv({x, b}) and b ∈ conv({y, a}) let Cx = conv({x} ∪ C) and Cy =
conv({y} ∪ C). (Cf. Figure 1.) Then diam(Cx) = ‖x − b‖ and diam(Cy) =
‖y − a‖.
By applying sharp threshold strategy-proofness and Lemma 1 (take for ²
in Lemma 1 the number L‖b−x‖/n) we have for all i-deviations v, w ∈ (Cx)N :
‖F (v)− F (w)‖ ≤ ‖b− x‖/n or
‖F (v)− v(i)‖, ‖F (w)− w(i)‖ ≤ ‖b− x‖/n. (8)
Similarly, for all i-deviations v, w ∈ (Cy)N :
‖F (v)− F (w)‖ ≤ ‖a− y‖/n or
‖F (v)− v(i)‖, ‖F (w)− w(i)‖ ≤ ‖a− y‖/n. (9)
For v = p and w = q and noting that p(j) = a and q(j) = b, we have by (7),
(8) applied for x = a, and (9) applied for y = b:
‖F (p)− a‖, ‖F (q)− b‖ ≤ ‖a− b‖/n. (10)
13
Since n ≥ 5, (10) implies
‖F (p)− F (q)‖ ≥ 3‖a− b‖/n. (11)
We now first prove the following claim for x and y as above.
Claim ‖F (px)− x‖ ≤ ‖b− x‖/n and ‖F (py)− y‖ ≤ ‖a− y‖/n.
Proof of Claim. Take a sequence z0 = a, z1, . . ., zt = x in conv({x, a})
such that ‖z` − z`−1‖ < 12‖z`−1 − b‖ for all ` = 1, . . . , t. We prove that‖F (pz`)− z`‖ ≤ ‖b− z`‖/n for all ` = 1, . . . , t, from which the first inequality
in the Claim follows. The second inequality can be proved analogously.
Case i = 1. First observe that by (11)
‖F (pz0)− F (pz1)‖+ ‖F (pz1)− F (pb)‖
= ‖F (p)− F (pz1)‖+ ‖F (pz1)− F (q))‖
≥ ‖F (p)− F (q)‖
≥ 3‖a− b‖/n
> 2‖z1 − b‖. (12)
Apply (8) on Cz1 to the pair pz1 and pb = q. If ‖F (pz1)−F (q)‖ > ‖b− z1‖/n
then ‖F (pz1) − z1‖ ≤ ‖b − z1‖/n and we are done. If ‖F (pz1) − F (q)‖ ≤
‖b− z1‖/n then by (12) ‖F (p)− F (pz1)‖ > ‖b− z1‖/n, hence (8) applied to
the pair p, pz1 on Cz1 implies ‖F (pz1) − z1‖ ≤ ‖b − z1‖/n and we are again
done.
Furthermore, by (10) we have ‖F (q)− b‖ ≤ ‖a− b‖/n ≤ ‖z1− b‖/n, so since
n ≥ 5 we have
‖F (pz1)− F (q)‖ ≥ 3‖b− z1‖/n.
Hence,
Cases ` = 2, . . . , t can be proved analogously to case ` = 1. ¢
Now take λ > 0 and aˆ, bˆ, c ∈ IRm such that c = 1
2
(aˆ + bˆ), ‖aˆ − bˆ‖ = 5λ,
C ⊆ B(c, 1
2
λ), C1 = conv({aˆ} ∪ B(c, 1
2
λ)), C2 = conv({bˆ} ∪ B(c, 1
2
λ)). (See
Figure 2.) Then, by the Claim, ‖F (paˆ)− aˆ‖ ≤ diam(C1)/n < λ and ‖F (pbˆ)−
bˆ‖ ≤ diam(C2)/n < λ. Furthermore, Lemma 1 and sharp threshold strategy-
proofness imply that for all i-deviations v, w in (Ck)N , where k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and C3 = C1 ∪ C2, we have
‖F (v)− F (w)‖ ≤ diam(Ck)/n ≤ λ
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Figure 2: Proof of Lemma 4
or
‖F (v)− v(j)‖, ‖F (w)− w(j)‖ ≤ diam(Ck)/n ≤ λ.
Note that the inequalities diam(Ck)/n ≤ λ are strict for k = 1, 2. Hence,
Lemma 3 applies and yields a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Let N ∈ P have at least five agents and let p ∈
(IRm)N be a profile. We proceed by induction on |p(N)|, where p(N) =
{p(i) : i ∈ N}.
If |p(N)| = 1, then F (p) = Fmean(p) by unanimity.
For the induction step, let |p(N)| = k > 1. Let C be the convex hull of
p(N). Take a and b in p(N) diametrical in C. Let S = {i ∈ N : p(i) /∈ {a, b}}.
Let |S| = s and n = |N | = k + l + s such that p = (ak, pS, bl). Here, ak
means that k agents vote for a, and pS = (p(i))i∈S. Let q = (ak+l, pS) and
r = (pS, b
k+l). The induction hypothesis entails
F (q) = Fmean(q) =
k + l
n
a+
s
n
Fmean(pS)
and
F (r) = Fmean(r) =
k + l
n
b+
s
n
Fmean(pS).
It follows that
‖F (q)− F (r)‖ = k + l
n
‖b− a‖.
By repeated application of Lemma 4,
‖F (q)− F (p)‖ ≤ l
n
‖b− a‖
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and
‖F (r)− F (p)‖ ≤ k
n
‖b− a‖.
It follows that these inequalities must be equalities, and in particular
F (p) =
k
k + l
F (q) +
l
k + l
F (r)
=
k
n
a+
l
n
b+
s
n
Fmean(pS)
= Fmean(p).
This completes the proof of the induction step and of the theorem. 2
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